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Abstract
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alter-
natives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus dene
sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish.
When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we show that this opti-
mal behavior coincides with an intuitive and common denition of sincerity. For
voting mechanisms allowing for multiple message types, such as approval voting
(AV), there exists no conclusive denition of sincerity in the literature. We show
that for AV, votersoptimal strategy tends to one of the existent denitions of sin-
cerity, consisting in voting for those alternatives that yield more than the average
of cardinal utilities.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we discuss what sincere voting means under di¤erent voting mechanisms when
voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. A denition of sincerity is important since
it allows to compare the properties of di¤erent voting rules with respect to votersstrategic
behavior. Under di¤erent voting mechanisms, and given voterspreferences over alternatives,
voters may be better able to favour the election of preferred outcomes by behaving strategi-
cally instead of sincerely and thus, manipulate the voting mechanism.1 In order to provide a
general denition of sincerity, our approach is to consider this strategic component of voting
and eliminate it.
There exists ample literature on the denition of sincerity for di¤erent voting mechanisms
and on which voting rules may achieve it.2 Brams and Fishburn (1978) dene sincere voting
as non-strategic behavior in which individuals vote directly in accordance with their prefer-
ences. The problem arises because translating preferences over alternatives to sincere votes
may not be direct under some voting rules, since they may demand to structure votes in a
di¤erent format than preferences may be specied.
Since the majority of the voting literature limits the analysis to ordinal preferences over
alternatives, votes are structured in the same format as preferences and thus, this problem
has not been highlighted.3 However, it seems plausible to assume that voters may be able
to quantify di¤erences between alternatives and thus, they may have cardinal preferences
over them. Under cardinal preferences, if a voting mechanism exactly required all cardinal
information, the denition of sincere votingwould be straightforward. A sincere vote
would just be the declaration of the cardinal utility that each alternative gives to a voter.
Consider the following example. There are three alternatives x; y and z that yield the
following utilities to a voter: U(x) = 0:8; U(y) = 0:5 and U(z) = 0:1. A voting rule that
required all cardinal information would have associated as sincere votingthe revelation of
utilities 0:8; 0:5 and 0:1 respectively.
However, the majority of voting mechanisms only require (partial) ordinal information
from voters and thus a denition of sincerity is more complex. Votes may be understood as
messages since they transmit information on the desirability of the alternatives for the voters.
The translation of cardinal utilities to non-cardinal votes may then depend on the number
(and type) of messages each voting mechanism allows.
If the voting mechanism only allows for one possible message type then identifying sin-
cere behavior is not so problematic. A sincere vote would be the one that intuitively best
represents the order of the cardinal preferences, given the restrictions of the voting mech-
anism. For example, the plurality rule is a clear case of a voting rule that allows for only
one message type, since voters can only choose between singletons (with the meaning of a
1Any voting rule is subject to strategic voting behaviour when its range has at least three alternatives and
there are no dictators (Gibbard (1973), Satterwhaite (1975).
2Starting with Farquharson (1969).
3See, for example, Arrow (1951), Fishburn (1973) and Nurmi (1987).
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superior alternative, since the aggregation process will consider positively such singletons).
Thus sincere voting under Plurality Rule (PR) would intuitively t with voting (in the top
set) for the alternative that yields highest utility to the voter. In our example, a sincere voter
under PR would then declare her real preferences by voting for alternative fxg. Intuitively,
any other possible message, for example, fzg would be a worse representation of the voters
real cardinal preferences and thus, would not be sincere.
There are however several voting rules that allow for more than one message type. In such
cases, there is no clear intuition of what the best representation of cardinal preferences would
be. A paradigmatic example of such rules is Approval Voting (AV), in which the decision of
whether to include an alternative among the approvedones or not may naturally depend
on the di¤erence in cardinal utility between alternatives. In our example, if the voter was
only allowed to approve her best alternative(to choose from the set of singletons of 2fx;y;zg)
then voting fxg would intuitively be sincere as previously mentioned. On the other hand, if
the voter was only allowed to vote for pairs of alternatives (which is what Negative Voting
would do), then voting fx; yg would be sincere as it best ts with her cardinal preferences
given the restrictions. However, as AV allows voters to specify any subset of alternatives as
the set of approved options, it may not be clear whether voting fxg or fx; yg is the sincere
message.
Previous literature has discussed at least two denitions of sincerity for AV. The rst one
species that if one alternative is voted in the top set (approved), all alternatives that yield
higher cardinal utility to the individual should also be included in the top set to be considered
as sincere.4 Notice that this denition is somewhat weak as several messages would then be
considered sincere. In our example, fx; y; zg (meaning all alternatives are approved); 
(meaning all alternatives are disapproved), fxg and fx; yg would all be considered sincere
under this weak denition. A second and more restrictive denition denes sincerity as voting
for those alternatives that yield the individual more cardinal utility than the average of all
alternatives.5 In our numerical example, the only sincere voting representation would then
be to vote for both x and y (i.e. fx; yg) since both provide more cardinal utility than the
average (0:8 > 0:47 and 0:5 > 0:47).
As we have seen, complexity in the translation of preferences over alternatives into votes
creates ambiguity in dening sincere voting. We abstract from such ambiguity by considering
a new approach. We consider a voter under a hypothetical situation in which conditions to
behave strategically are diminished and dene sincerity as her optimal voting strategy under
such conditions.
Strategic voting implies balancing the relative preference for the di¤erent alternatives
against the relative likelihood of inuencing the outcome of the election.6 Notice that whether
a voter assesses that her vote may a¤ect the outcome depends on how she thinks other voters
will vote. Strategic behavior may thus be enhanced the more information voters have on the
4See Brams and Fishburn (1981) and Niemi (1984) .
5See, for instance, Merrill (1983), Merrill and Nagel (1987) and Ho¤man (1982) who present some results
characterizing this behavior under a very restrictive set of assumptions.
6See Fisher and Myatt (2002).
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strategies of other voters. Weber (1978) goes as far as claiming that in settings where voters
have little access to information concerning either the preferences of other voters or their
intended behavior, voters can be presumed to vote sincerely, since the lack of information
means there is no basis for voting in some clever strategic way. Our rst result shows that
Webers (1978) intuition is correct for any voting rule allowing for only one message type
and three alternatives. We show that in this setting, the best strategy of a voter with no
information on other votersstrategies is unique and independent of the size of the electorate.
We thus dene sincere voting behaviour as this optimal strategy for voting rules that allow
for only one message type.
However, when voting rules allow for more than one message type things become more
complex. In settings with three alternatives and taking AV as our benchmark example of
such rules, our second result shows that the optimal strategy for any voter under AV when
information on othersstrategies is eliminated depends on the size of the electorate. Thus,
it cannot be the case that we consider this behavior as a precise denition of sincerity, since
how sincere a vote is should not vary with the number of voters. We show, however, that the
optimal strategy when there is no information on othersstrategies always satises (for any
size of the electorate) the weak denition of sincerity in AV previously discussed.
We next introduce new conditions that may diminish strategic behaviour. A natural
intuition is that the larger the electorate the lower the manipulative e¤ect of a strategic vote
on the outcome of the election may be. Therefore, following our approach, we check what
the optimal strategy in AV is when the size of the electorate tends to innity (and there is no
information on othersstrategies). We dene sincere voting as the optimal strategy under such
conditions. Our third result shows that the optimal strategy under such conditions coincides
with the second and stronger denition of sincerity previously discussed in the literature. Our
paper thus provides new support for the idea that sincerity in AV implies adding to the top
set all alternatives that yield (cardinal) utility above the average of the utilities generated by
all alternatives. Although this denition is not new, ours is not an intuitive denition but
the result of a new methodology consisting in eliminating those features of the problem that
generate strategic behaviour.
We have focused on the case of three alternatives x; y and z: Although this case is of
course special, it is the simplest case that allows to di¤erentiate between di¤erent voting
rules while maintaining conditions for strategic voting to appear.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the notation and the basic
assumptions made. Section 3 discusses sincerity in simple voting mechanisms (Result 1),
while Section 4 discusses sincerity in complex voting mechanisms, in particular in approval
voting (Results 2 and 3). Section 5 concludes.
7See Myerson and Weber (1993), Myerson (2002) and Dhillon and Lockwood (2004).
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2 Notation and Denitions
Consider a set of n agents f1; 2; :::; ng and a set of three alternatives X = fx; y; zg: Individuals
are endowed with cardinal utilities over alternatives U = (Uj(k)) with j 2 f1; 2; :::; ng;
k 2 X and Uj(k) 2 [0; 1]. For the elegance of the exposition, assume that there are not two
alternatives providing the same utility to each agent.8
Assume there exists a set of messages M from which each agent has to choose one. Such
message is the agents vote and transmits information on her preferences. In this paper we
consider sets of messages M containing either linear orders over X or subsets of X:9
Consider any bijective mapping  : X ! X. Given a message m 2 M , with m being a
linear order, then (m) is a linear order such that: x (m)y , (x) m (y): Given a message
m 2 M , with m being a subset of alternatives m = fx1; :::; xtg; then (m) denotes a subset
of alternatives such that: (m) = f(x1); :::; (xt)g: We say that two messages m and m0
belong to the same message type if there exists a bijective mapping  : X ! X such that
m0 = (m). We now impose an additional condition on the valid sets of messages in order
to avoid voting mechanisms to be biased towards alternatives: if the set of possible messages
M contains a message m then it also contains any other message of the form (m), i.e.,
m 2M; : X ! X a bijective mapping =) (m) 2M . The class of messages which belong
to the same message type as m is denoted by [m]:
A voting mechanism V : Mn ! 2fx;y;zg can be dened as the composition of a set
of messages (among which the voters can choose one) and an aggregation process of the
collected messages such that some alternatives are chosen. We refer to elements ofMn asm =
(m1; :::;mn) with mj 2 M for j = 1; :::; n: We naturally denote (m) = ((m1); :::; (mn)):
Finally, we denote, as usual, m j = (m1; :::;mj 1;mj+1; :::;mn):
A voting mechanism may allow a set of possible messages with several message types.
We rst classify voting mechanisms according to the number of message types associated to
them. The crucial property to study sincerity will be whether voting mechanisms have a
single or several message types associated to them.
Denition 1 A voting mechanism is said to be simple if it only allows for one message type:
Otherwise, it is said to be complex.
Two examples of simple voting mechanisms are the Borda Rule and the Plurality Rule.
In the former, the set of possible messages contains all linear orders over alternatives while
in the latter, the set of possible messages contains all singletons, i.e., M = ffxg; fyg; fzgg:
A prime example of a complex voting mechanism is Approval Voting. We will formally
dene it below as we will discuss it thoroughly in the following.
Once we have discussed messages, we now briey refer to the aggregation process. In
particular, we now dene some properties on how voting mechanisms may aggregate messages
to select alternatives.
8Parallel results are obtained without such assumption, although proofs become tedious without adding
further insights.
9Messages on linear orders or subsets of alternatives are the most common approach to voting.
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Denition 2 A voting mechanism V is Neutral in alternatives if for any permutation  of
the set of alternatives and any m in Mn; then V ((m)) =  (V (m)) :
Neutrality in alternatives implies that the names of the alternatives do not a¤ect the
selection of alternatives.
Our second denition refers to the monotonicity of the aggregation process. We distin-
guish between voting mechanisms composed by linear orders or subsets as messages.
Denition 3 A voting mechanism V with M containing linear orders (respectively subsets
of alternatives) is weakly monotonic if for any alternative x; for all y; z 2 Xnfxg; for all j 2
f1; :::; ng and for any pair of messagescollections m and m0 with y mj z () y m0j z and x
mj y =) x m0j y; (respectively y 2 m() y 2 m0 and x 2 mj =) x 2 m0j) , then:
x 2 V (m) =) x 2 V (m0) ;
fxg = V (m) =) fxg = V (m0) :
Our monotonicity condition is mild. It just implies that if an agents message is modied
such that it favours an alternative x, the voting mechanism responds accordingly. Thus, if
x was in the elected set before modifying agents message in a particular way, then it is also
elected under the new message. Similarly, if x is the only elected alternative then it must
also be the only elected alternative under the new message.
Finally, we dene Approval Voting since we will use it throughly. Notice that it satises
Neutrality in alternatives and Monotonicity.
Denition 4 A voting mechanism V is Approval Voting if M = 2fx;y;zg and the selected
alternatives are those that maximize the number of messages in which they appear.10
Using the above denitions, our goal is to dene sincere voting behaviour for voting
mechanisms. We understand sincere voting behaviour as opposed to strategic behaviour.
The latter comprises the possibility of favouring the election of preferred outcomes by mis-
representing sincere messages. There exist some conditions that facilitate the appearance
of strategic behaviour. For instance, the inuence of an individual agents message on the
outcome of the election or the amount of information agents have on otherspreferences over
alternatives. Our approach is to dene sincere voting as the optimal voting strategy when
the conditions that ease strategic behaviour are diminished. Since such approach requires to
study how agents react to uncertainty, we impose the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1 In the absence of information on other agents preferences over alter-
natives, agents believe that any possible combination of othersmessages is equally probable.
10Merril and Nagel (1987) di¤erentiate between balloting methods and the decision rules that produce an
outcome. In that spirit, they would claim that AV is our balloting method, while, given our denition, the
outcome of the election is decided under Plurality Rule. Our denitions consider both characteristics of voting
rules, i.e., the set of available messages and the way to aggregate them.
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Formally, for all j and for all m j 2 Mn 1; pj(m j) = ( 1]M )n 1 where pj(m j) is the
probability with which agent j beliefs other agents will transmit messages m j :
Notice that the probability each agent assigns to any combination of messages by other
agents clearly depends on the cardinality of the set of messages. In particular, for the case
of AV, 8j; and for all m j 2Mn 1; pj(m j) =
 
1
2]X
n 1
:
Assumption 2 Given agentsbeliefs, they maximize their expected utility over alterna-
tives.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are a simple way for voters to resolve the uncertainty about others
preferences. Notice that we aim to strengthen conditions that eliminate strategic voting
and thus, our assumptions refer to cases in which agents can not form clear expectations
about how others will vote. Moreover, these assumptions may have a behavioural support.
Both assumptions are also the common starting point to dene k-levels of rationality in the
literature on degrees of cognitive complexity which has found certain experimental validity.11
3 Sincerity in simple voting mechanisms
We aim to dene sincerity for simple voting mechanisms as the best response strategy when
the possibility of strategic behaviour is diminished. Theorem 1 conrms the intuition that
under such mechanisms sincerity implies transmitting pieces of ordinal information contained
in agentscardinal preferences over alternatives.
Theorem 1: Let V be a simple voting mechanism satisfying Neutrality in alternatives
and Weak Monotonicity: Assume, there is no information on agents preferences over al-
ternatives X = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any number of agents n;
agent is best response (sincere behaviour) is:
 For M = [m] with m being a linear order, the linear order such that x m y m z ,
Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z).
 For M = [m] with m being a subset of alternatives, the subset of the ]m alternatives
which provide highest utility to agent i:
Proof: We proceed to prove separately the cases in which the set of messages is the set
of linear orders and the cases in which the set of messages is a collection of subsets of X.
 We rst consider the case in whichM = flinear orders over Xg: Consider wlog. Ui(x) >
Ui(y) > Ui(z): Consider the linear order x m y m z by m. We have to prove that m is
agent is best response independently of the number of agents in society.
11See Stahl (1993), Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Broseta, Costa-Gomes
and Crawford (2001) and Goeree and Holt (2004).
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We show that m is a better response than m0, where y m0 x m0 z: To see this, let us
analyze all the possible situations in which transmitting m0 could be benecial for agent i:
Consider any combination of messages by the other agents in society, m i. Then, given that
the voting mechanism is Weakly Monotonic, we know that x 2 V (m i;m0)) x 2 V (m i;m)
and y 2 V (m i;m) ) y 2 V (m i;m0). We also know that fxg = V (m i;m0) ) fxg =
V (m i;m) and fyg = V (m i;m) ) fyg = V (m i;m0): The following table species all
possible outcomes of the election in which declaring m0 instead of m may be benecial for
agent i: Any other combination of othersmessages always yields a worse outcome when
declaring m0. For instance, outcome fx; yg whenever i states m yields lower utility than
outcome fx; zg whenever i states m0, since Ui(z)+Ui(x)2 < Ui(y)+Ui(x)2 and thus declaring m0
would not be benecial. Notice also that not every pair of outcomes can be associated to
messages m and m0: For example, the outcome fy; zg whenever i states m and outcome fx; yg
whenever i states m0 is not possible since x 2 V (m i;m0) but x =2 V (m i;m):
Messages Outcome
m fx; zg fx; y; zg fx; zg fx; zg fx; y; zg fy; zg fzg fzg
m0 fx; yg fx; yg fx; y; zg fyg fyg fyg fyg fy; zg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)
Notice that under cases 3); 4) and 5); m0 yields higher expected utility than m only when
Ui(y) >
Ui(x)+Ui(z)
2 :
In order to prove that message m is a better response than m0, we show that, for any
of the previous cases (associated to a combination of messages by the others), there exists
another combination of messages by the others such that:
1. Its probability of occurrence is larger.
2. The benet from transmitting m instead of m0 is larger than the benet from trans-
mitting m0 instead of m in the initial case:
Consider the bijection  : X ) X, where (x) = y; (y) = x and (z) = z. For k;
k 2 f1; :::; 8g; consider the combination of othersmessagesmk i which makes transmittingm0
benecial with respect to m. Consider also the combination of othersmessages (mk i): By
Assumption 1, individual i assigns the same probability to messages (mk i) and m
k
 i: Since
(m) = m0 and (m0) = m; by Neutrality in alternatives, it must be that V
 
m;(mk i)

=

 
V
 
m0;mk i

and V
 
m0; (mk i)

= 
 
V
 
m;mk i

: Thus, we can compute parallel cases
(with equal probability) to those of the previous table. The outcomes of the voting mechanism
now are:
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Messages Outcome
m fx; yg fx; yg fx; y; zg fxg fxg fxg fxg fx; zg
m0 fy; zg fx; y; zg fy; zg fy; zg fx; y; zg fx; zg fzg fzg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)
For cases k; k 2 f1; :::; 8g; the benet obtained from declaring m instead of m0 is, in all
the cases, at least as large as the loss for the corresponding case k. Given that any of these
cases has the same probability as its counterpart, m guarantees a expected utility at least as
large as m0:
Showing that any other message m00 yields lower expected utility than m follows exactly
the same reasoning.12 Thus, m is agent is best response.
 We now consider situations in which M is a family of subsets of X: In order to have a
simple voting mechanism, there only exist four possibilities:
M1 = fg;M2 = fXg;M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg and M4 = ffx; yg; fx; zg; fy; zgg:
M1 and M2 are trivial cases given that agents can not decide which message to transmit.
Plurality Rule is a prime example of a voting mechanism using M3. Negative Voting (or
Antiplurality) is an example of a voting mechanism using M4:13 We here prove the result for
M3 and leave the analogous proof for M4 for the reader.14
Consider M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg and wlog. Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z): We rst show that
transmitting fxg is better than transmitting fyg: Consider any combination of messages
in society, m i. Then, given that the voting mechanism is Weakly Monotonic, we now
that x 2 V (m i; fyg) ) x 2 V (m i; fxg) and y 2 V (m i; fxg) ) y 2 V (m i; fyg).
Additionally, fxg = V (m i; fyg) ) fxg = V (m i; fxg) and fyg = V (m i; fxg) ) fyg
= V (m i; fyg): The following table, which is in fact equivalent to the case of linear orders,
species all possible outcomes in which transmitting fyg may be benecial for agent i:
Messages Outcome
fxg fx; yg fx; yg fx; y; zg fxg fxg fxg fxg fx; zg
fyg fy; zg fx; y; zg fy; zg fy; zg fx; y; zg fx; zg fzg fzg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)
12Since all the proofs rely in the same construction, for simplicity we explicitly exclude them. They are,
however, available upon request.
13One is tempted to think that Negative Voting also usesM3, given that agents transmit their least preferred
alternative. However, for Negative Voting to satisfy weak monotonicity, its messages must be interpreted as
transmitting all the alternatives but the least preferred one.
14We consider this theorem as a baseline for the results of the following section and thus, we explicitly avoid
this part of the proof which can be easily derived from the one presented.
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The analysis is parallel to the case of linear orders, but proving that fxg strictly yields a
larger expected utility than fyg: Reproducing the analysis with strategies fyg and fzg it can
be shown that fyg strictly yields a larger expected payo¤ than fzg:Thus, transmitting fxg
strictly yields a larger expected utility than fyg and fzg, concluding the proof for M3. 
We have therefore dened sincere voting behaviour under simple voting mechanisms.
Voters optimal strategy under no information conditions is to assign votes in a manner
that maintains some ordinal information of their true preferences. Notice that in simple
mechanisms this behaviour does not depend on the weight of an individual agents vote on
the outcome of the election. However, in the next section we show that the absence of
information is not enough to guarantee a precise denition of sincerity for complex voting
mechanisms. The reason is that best responses will depend, for instance, on the number of
agents participating in the election.
4 Complex Voting Mechanisms: Approval Voting
We consider in this section voting mechanisms which allow for several message types: Approval
Voting is a prototypical case of complex voting mechanisms. Under AV agents can transmit
a large variety of messages. For example, in the case of three alternatives, AV allows for the
set of messages M = 2fx;y;zg: This set is composed by the following four di¤erent message
types M1 = fg; M2 = fXg; M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg and M4 = ffx; yg; fx; zg; fy; zgg.
The message an agent chooses, and thus the message type used, naturally depends on
the cardinal utility alternatives yield. A denition of sincere voting behaviour is thus more
complicated. Brams and Fishburn (1981) and Niemi (1984) have previously dened sincerity
in AV as given that an agent supports an alternative, she must also support all alternatives
that are preferred to that one. Translating this argument to cardinal utilities and using our
notation, we establish a denition of weak sincerity :
Denition 5 Agent is message m is Weak Sincere under AV if for all x; y such that Ui(x) >
Ui(y); y 2 m implies x 2 m:
We refer to such denition as weak because it does not determine a unique message as
sincere, which may be an appealing property.
Weber (1978), Merrill (1983), Merrill and Nagel (1987) and Ho¤man (1982) provide a
stronger denition of sincerity in AV that uses cardinal utilities and uniquely determines one
message as sincere. Using our notation, such denition can be expressed as follows:
Denition 6 Agent is message m is Strong Sincere under AV if for all x 2 X:
x 2 m, Ui(x)  1
3
X
y2X
Ui(y):
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The strong denition of sincere voting under AV implies voting for those alternatives that
yield more utility than the average of utilities. This denition, although intuitively appealing,
has not been given a complete formal justication. In particular, it has been dened under a
restrictive set of assumptions, such as imposing specic probabilities on the number of votes
each alternative receives. As in the previous subsections, we obtain our results by precisely
calculating these probabilities using a cognitive process based only on initial beliefs over
individual votes. In the remainder of the paper, we show that the best response of an agent
under conditions that diminish the possibility of behaving strategically is precisely voting for
those alternatives that yield more than the average of utilities. Therefore, we provide stronger
support for this second denition of sincerity, which uniquely determines which message is
sincere in AV.
4.1 Dependence on the Size of the Electorate
We proceed here to obtain optimal voter behavior in the absence of information in order
to achieve a proper denition of sincerity in AV. Theorem 2 shows, however, that optimal
behavior is dependent on the number of individuals in a society, thus making impossible to
achieve a non-contingent denition of sincerity. However, it also shows that any behavior (for
any size of the electorate) satises the weak denition of sincerity in AV.
Theorem 2: Let V be Approval Voting. Assume Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z): Assume, there
is no information on agentspreferences over alternatives X = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1
and 2 hold. Then agent i transmits message fx; yg if and only if Ui(y)  (n)Ui(x) + (1 
(n))Ui(z) with (n) 2 (0; 1). Otherwise, agent i transmits message fxg.
Proof: Let Ui(x) > Ui(y) > Ui(z): In Theorem 1, we have proved that fxg is a best
response among strategies in M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg whenever the domain of the voting rule
V is M3: Notice that using the same procedure as the proof of Theorem 1, we can indeed
show that fxg is a best response among strategies in M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg whenever the
domain of the voting rule V is 2fx;y;zg: Given that AV satises Neutrality in alternatives
and Weak Monotonicity, we can ensure that fxg is a best response among strategies in
M3 = ffxg; fyg; fzgg: A similar argument applies for M4:
Therefore, the only messages worth considering are f; X; fxg; fx; ygg: We rst show
that voting fxg is always better than voting X (respectively ): Suppose that voting X
(respectively ) leads to have S 6= fxg as the set of elected alternatives.15 If x 2 S 6= fxg, then
transmitting fxg leads to have x as the unique elected outcome, which obviously dominates
S for agent i. If x =2 S, transmitting fxg leads either to have S as the set of elected outcomes
or to have S [ fxg as the set of elected outcomes. This is clearly preferable to the outcome
obtained when transmitting X (respectively ). Thus we focus on fx; yg and fxg:We present
here the situations in which fx; yg and fxg could yield di¤erent outcomes:
15Obviously if S = fxg then transmitting fxg has the same e¤ect on the election of outcomes.
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Messages Outcome
fxg fxg fzg fx; yg fx; zg fy; zg fx; y; zg
fx; yg fx; yg fy; zg fyg fx; y; zg fyg fyg
Cases 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
The previous table shows all possible combinations of others agentsmessages in which
messages fx; yg and fxg yield di¤erent outcomes. In order for these situations to occur, the
distribution of other agentsmessages must satisfy the following conditions:
1) ax = ay > az   1 4) ax + 1 = ay + 1 = az
2) ax + 1 < ay + 1 = az 5) ax + 1 < ay = az
3) ax = ay   1 > az   1 6) ax + 1 = ay = az;
where ak represents the number of times alternative k appears in other agentsmessages,
excluding agent i:
 Under Assumption 1, the probabilities Pq of each of these six conditions are:
P1 =
n 1P
t=0
tP
s=0
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
0B@ n  1
s
1CA
(23)n 1
P2 =
n 1P
t=2
t 2P
s=0
0B@ n  1
s
1CA
0B@ n  1
t  1
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
(23)n 1
P3 =
n 1P
t=1
t 1P
s=0
0B@ n  1
t  1
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
0B@ n  1
s
1CA
(23)n 1
P4 =
n 1P
t=1
0B@ n  1
t  1
1CA
0B@ n  1
t  1
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
(23)n 1
P5 =
n 1P
t=2
t 2P
s=0
0B@ n  1
s
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
(23)n 1
P6 =
n 1P
t=1
0B@ n  1
t  1
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
0B@ n  1
t
1CA
(23)n 1
Hence, the expected utility of messages fxg and fx; yg under assumption 1 can be
expressed in terms of these probabilities. For message fxg, the expected utility equals:
P1Ui(x) + P2Ui(z) + P3

Ui(x) + Ui(y)
2

+ P4

Ui(x) + Ui(z)
2

+P5

Ui(y) + Ui(z)
2

+ P6

Ui(x) + Ui(y) + Ui(z)
3

whereas for message fx; yg the expected utility equals:
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P1

Ui(x) + Ui(y)
2

+ P2

Ui(y) + Ui(z)
2

+ P3Ui(y) +
P4

Ui(x) + Ui(y) + Ui(z)
3

+ P5Ui(y) + P6Ui(y)
Therefore, using Assumption 2, the condition for preferring to transmit fx; yg has to be
that it yields a higher expected value than transmitting fxg, i.e., 
P1
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
6 +
P6
3

Ui(x)+
 
P2
2 +
P4
6 +
P5
2 +
P6
3

Ui(z) 
 
P1
2 +
P2
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
3 +
P5
2 +
2P6
3

Ui(y)
Denoting:
f(n) =
 
P1
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
6 +
P6
3

g(n) =
 
P2
2 +
P4
6 +
P5
2 +
P6
3

h(n) =
 
P1
2 +
P2
2 +
P3
2 +
P4
3 +
P5
2 +
2P6
3

;
we can express the previous inequality as f(n)h(n)Ui(x) +
g(n)
h(n)Ui(z)  Ui(y). Since f(n) +
g(n) = h(n); we only need to consider the function (n) = f(n)h(n) to conclude the proof. Since
any Pq : t = 1; :::; 6 is di¤erent from zero, it follows that (n) 6= 1 and (n) 6= 0. 
Corollary 7 Let V be Approval Voting. Assume, there is no information on agentsprefer-
ences over alternatives X = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then agent is optimal
behaviour satises the weak denition of sincerity.
Proof. Notice that following Theorem 2, the only possible optimal messages are fxg and
fx; yg; and thus, it easily follows that the weak denition of sincerity always holds.
Whether the alternative yielding second highest utility to an agent is included in her
transmitted message depends on its relative cardinal utility with respect to the utilities
yielded by the most and least preferred alternatives. Such dependence rests on the weights
measured by the function (n); which varies with the size of the electorate n: For example,
if U(x) = 0:9; U(y) = 0:7 and U(z) = 0:1, basic calculus shows that an agent optimally
transmits message fxg when the size of the electorate is 2: On the other hand, the same
agent transmits message fx; yg when the size of the electorate is 3: It seems unreasonable
that how sincere a voting strategy is depends on the size of the electorate. Thus, in the
following subsection we further impose conditions to diminish the possibility of strategic
voting in order to obtain sincere behaviour.
4.2 Sincerity in Approval Voting
The inuence of an individual agents vote on the outcome of an election diminishes the
bigger the size of an electorate. Our last result shows that when the number of agents tends
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to innity the previously dened strong denition of sincere approval voting arises as the best
response of any agent.
In Theorem 2, we identied agentsbest response in the absence of information. Under
such conditions, to include in the transmitted message the alternative yielding the second
highest utility partially depends on the size of the electorate through the weighting function
(n): Theorem 3 determines the limit of (n) when n goes to innity.
Theorem 3: Let V be Approval Voting. Assume there is no information on agents
preferences over alternatives X = fx; y; zg and assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then:
(n) !
n !1
1
2
:
Proof: Following notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 2, we want to prove that
(n) = f(n)h(n) !n !1
1
2 : Given that
f(n) + g(n) = h(n);
this is equivalent to proving,
f(n)  g(n)
h(n)
!
n !1 0:
Substituting values and after basic calculus,
f(n)  g(n)
h(n)
=
1
2(P1   P5)
h(n)
+
1
2(P3   P2)
h(n)

1
2(P1   P5)
1
2P5
+
1
2(P3   P2)
1
2P2
=
P1   P5
P5
+
P3   P2
P2
:
Hence, proving
P1   P5
P5
+
P3   P2
P2
!
n !1 0;
implies f(n) g(n)h(n) !n !1 0:
Actually, we here prove that P1 P5P5 !n !1 0 and
P3 P2
P2
!
n !1 0; which is stronger than
what is needed. We start by proving that P1 P5P5 !n !1 0 .
Consider the following two standard properties of combinatorial numbers which apply to
any non-negative integers k; i for k  i :
Property 1:
 
k
i
!
+
 
k
i  1
!
=
 
k + 1
i
!
:
Property 2 (symmetry):
 
k
i
!
=
 
k
k   i
!
:
By Property 1,
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lim
n !1
P1   P5
P5
= lim
n !1
n 1P
t=2
24 n  1
t
!2 " 
n  1
t
!
+
 
n  1
t  1
!#35
n 1P
t=2
 
n  1
t
!2
t 2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
! =
= lim
n !1
n 1P
t=2
24 n  1
t
!2 " 
n
t
!#35
n 1P
t=2
 
n  1
t
!2
t 2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
! :
We only consider the cases in which n is even (a similar reasoning would follow for the
case in which n is odd). From the last expression and using Property 2 we can derive,
lim
n !1
P1   P5
P5
= lim
n !1
n 1P
t=2
24 n  1
t
!2 " 
n
t
!#35
n 1P
t=2
 
n  1
t
!2
t 2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
! = lim
n !1
A1 +A2 +A3
B1 +B2 +B3
where,
A1 =
n 2
2P
t=2
 
n  1
t
!2 " 
n
t
!
+
 
n
n  t  1
!#
,
A2 =
 
n  1
n  2
!2 
n
n  2
!
;
A3 =
 
n  1
n  1
!2 
n
n  1
!
:
B1 =
n 2
2P
t=2
 
n  1
t
!2 "
t 2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
+
n t 3P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!#
;
B2 =
 
n  1
n  2
!2
n 4P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
;
B3 =
 
n  1
n  2
!2
n 3P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
:
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Notice that by Property 2,
 
n
n  t  1
!
=
 
n
t+ 1
!
: Applying Properties 1 and 2 to
A1, we obtain:
A1 =
n 2
2P
t=2
 
n  1
t
!2 
n+ 1
t+ 1
!
:
Notice that lim
n !1
A1+A2+A3
B1+B2+B3
can be expressed as lim
n!1
X
t
at(n)X
t
bt(n)
. By taking into account
that lim
n!1
X
t
at(n)X
t
bt(n)
 lim
n!1
akn
bkn
where kn is the value that maximizes
at(n)
bt(n)
for dimension n;
it is su¢ cient to prove that lim
n!1
akn
bkn
= 0.
Notice that,
at
bt
=
 
n  1
t
!2 
n+ 1
t+ 1
!
 
n  1
t
!2 "
t 2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
+
n t 3P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!#
and therefore,
at+1
bt+1
=
 
n  1
t+ 1
!2 
n+ 1
t+ 2
!
 
n  1
t+ 1
!2 "
t 1P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
+
n t 4P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!# :
Notice that t+ 1  n 22 implies t+ 2  n2  n+12 =)
 
n+ 1
t+ 2
!

 
n+ 1
t+ 1
!
and
bt   bt 1=
 
n  1
t+ 2
!
 
 
n  1
t  1
!
> 0; and therefore atbt 
at+1
bt+1
if and only if,
 
n+ 1
t+ 1
!
 
n  1
t
!2 "
t 2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
+
n t 3P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!# 
 
n+ 1
t+ 2
!
 
n  1
t+ 1
!2 "
t 1P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
+
n t 4P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!# :
Therefore,
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lim
n!1
at
bt
 lim
n!1
 
n  1
n 2
2
!2 
n+ 1
n
2
!
 
n  1
n 2
2
!2 "n 6
2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
+
n 4
2P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!# =
Lim
n!1
 
n  1
n
2
!
n 1P
s=0
 
n  1
s
!
 
 
n  1
n 2
2
!
 
 
n  1
n
2
!
 
 
n  1
n+2
2
! =
lim
n!1
 
n+ 1
n
2
!
2n 1  
 
n  1
n 2
2
!
 
 
n  1
n
2
!
 
 
n  1
n+2
2
! = 0:
The proof for P3 P2P2 !n !1 0 is similar, and thus we omit it. This concludes the proof. 
Theorem 3 says that as the size of the electorate increases, agentsbest response consists
in voting for those alternatives that yield more than the average of utilities. Given that we
have eliminated the most important components of strategic behavior, namely information
on otherspreferences and the weight of an individual vote in determining the outcome, we
interpret such best response as sincere voting behaviour under approval voting.
Notice that previous attempts to dene sincere behaviour under approval voting did not
di¤erentiate between the implications of Theorems 2 and 3.16 The reason is that they assumed
that the probability of a tie between the number of votes that two alternatives received was
equal to the probability of one of the alternatives surpassing the other by just one vote. As
a by-product of our Theorem 3, we have shown that such assumption only holds true in the
limit.
5 Discussion
Identifying sincere voting behaviour under a variety of voting rules is an important starting
point in the discussion of adopting new voting mechanisms. A denition of sincerity is almost
straightforward when simple voting mechanisms are considered. However, we have seen that
under a complex voting mechanism such as Approval voting dening sincerity is cumbersome.
Approval Voting is a paradigmatic voting mechanism to study how cardinal utilities over
alternatives a¤ect sincere behaviour. We conjecture that the di¢ culty in dening sincerity
arises as a consequence of the presence of several message types in complex mechanisms. Our
intuition should be conrmed by studying other complex voting mechanisms.
16See, for instance, Ho¤man (1982).
17
Our approach to dene sincere voting behaviour consists in opposing sincere behavior to
strategic behavior. We methodologically contribute to obtain a formal denition of sincerity,
by omitting the elements that facilitate strategic behavior; namely, by increasing the size
of the electorate and by eliminating information on other agentspreferences. The optimal
behavior obtained under such conditions is thus what we dene as sincere voting behaviour.
We have shown that under Approval Voting sincere agents vote for those alternatives that
yield more than the average of the utilities.
Notice that following our approach, the denition of sincerity coincides with the previously
provided strong denition of sincerity. Our technical contribution consists in calculating the
optimal voting behaviour by assessing explicitly the probability of each of the possible races
between alternatives that can occur instead of assuming they all have the same probability.
Therefore, we have provided stronger support to an intuitive denition of sincerity when
agents have cardinal utilities over three alternatives.
Our aim in this paper has been to provide a denition of sincere voting behaviour. Nev-
ertheless, this is not equivalent to identifying sincere voting from the results of an election.
Knowledge on the cardinal value that the alternatives yield to the voters is required in empiri-
cal tests of our results. An experiment controlling for such utility values may be a worthwhile
avenue to explore how individuals vote when informational conditions or on the inuence of
their votes are changed.
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